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Computable general equilibriuma b s t r a c t
There is a paucity of quantitative impact assessments of the sectorial and macroeconomic impacts of CAP
budget reform for EU member states. To ﬁll this gap, the current study employs a sophisticated agricul-
tural variant of the GTAP model to evaluate the recently agreed CAP spending limits for the ﬁnancial per-
iod 2014–2020 as well as a more radical 50% cut to the CAP budget proposed by the UK government. The
study incorporates methodological innovation in terms of the modelling of CAP budgetary mechanisms.
Furthermore, ofﬁcial EU auditing statistics are employed to (i) greatly improve the existing representa-
tion of agricultural support payments in the GTAP benchmark data and (ii) implement a detailed contem-
porary CAP baseline for member states to capture both the decoupled/coupled split of support payments
and the distribution of support across both ‘pillars’.
In general, CAP expenditure cuts have muted impacts on EU and world agricultural markets; whereas
changes in net transfer payments have implications for real income and macro trade balances in EU
member states. This observation is particularly pertinent when assessing conciliatory reductions in the
UK rebate in exchange for deeper CAP budget cuts.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction regardless of the recipient member state.1 Over time, however, thisolicies orOver ﬁfty years since its inception, the common agricultural pol-
icy (CAP) remains one of the central tenets of the European Union
(EU). Over this time period, the raison d’etre of the CAP has evolved
radically from being a blunt policy instrument to promote self-suf-
ﬁciency and farmer incomes, to amultifunctionalmodel of 21st cen-
tury agriculture reﬂecting broader societal concerns regarding the
environment, rural livelihoods, food traceability, animal welfare,
etc. As an illustration of this ongoing policy shift, the 2013 CAP
reform seeks to further strengthen the relation between agricultural
production and environmental responsibility by explicitly linking
up to 30% of the direct payments envelope to greening practices
(i.e., crop diversiﬁcation, maintaining permanent pasture, etc.).
On its inception, the CAP budget mechanismwas founded under
the guiding paradigm of ‘ﬁnancial solidarity’, where CAP budget
transfers were targeted in respect of common policy objectives,utopianvisionof theCAPbudgethas had towithstandmorepragmatic
ﬁnancial concerns. In 1984, the Fontainebleau European Council
granted a rebate to theUnitedKingdom(UK),2whichgave rise to a ser-
ies of associated correction mechanisms to placate objections from
other member states. The ensuing result is a complicated intra-com-
munity compensation mechanism which clearly challenges the prin-
ciple of ﬁnancial solidarity. Thus, whilst the CAP budget undeniably
bestows non-pecuniary beneﬁtswhich go beyondmere ﬁnancial con-
siderations (Le Cacheux, 2005), in a period of post-crisis austerity, ﬁs-
cal responsibility and national political interests take precedence over
EU ideology (Boulanger, 2011). Such sentiment was certainly in evi-
dence when, in June 2013, a hard fought CAP budget agreement was
reached for the next seven year spending plan – known as the multi-






I. Sectoral disaggregation (20 GTAP sectors)
Wheat; Other Grains; Oilseeds; Raw Sugar; Vegetables, Fruits and Nuts; Other Crops; Cattle and Sheep; Pigs and Poultry; Raw Milk; Wool; Red Meat; White Meat;
Dairy; Sugar Processing; Other Food Processing; Beverages and Tobacco; Energy; Extraction; Manufacturing; Services
I. Regional disaggregation (27 GTAP regions)
United Kingdom (UK); Netherlands (NL); Sweden (SE); Denmark (DK); Germany (DE); Austria (AT); France (FR); Italy (IT); Spain (ES); Rest of the EU15 (Ro15); Poland
(PL); Romania (RO); Rest of the EU15 (Ro12); Croatia (HR); European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA); United States of America (USA); Canada (CAN); Mercosur
(MERC); Russian Federation (RUS); Eastern Partnership (EAP); China (CHN); India (IND); Japan (JAP); Australia & New Zealand (AUSNZ); Middle East & North Africa
(MENA); Less Developed Countries (LDC); Rest of the World (ROW)
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cuts of 13% in pillar 1 (marketmeasures and direct payments) and 18%
pillar 2 (rural development measures) for the 2014–2020 period.
Against this background, it is perhaps surprising that there is a
paucity of impact assessments examining the sectorial and macro-
economic impacts of CAP budget cuts. One exception is Nowicki
et al. (2009), which employs a multi-region computable general
equilibrium (CGE) framework to examine different CAP policy sce-
narios to 2020. Under the ‘baseline’, or status quo scenario the CAP
budget is cut by 20% in real terms (constant in nominal terms), via
a 30% cut in pillar 1 and a 105% increase in pillar 2. At the other
extreme, a stylised 75% budgetary reduction in real terms (55% in
nominal terms) is modelled via the elimination of pillar 1 and a
100% increase in pillar 2 compared with the baseline. Although
offering interesting insights, this study does not provide a compre-
hensive representation of pillar 2 payments, nor is there any consid-
eration given to EU member state contributions to ﬁnance CAP
budgetary expenditures (known in EU parlance as the ‘own
resources’ mechanism). In other (CGE) multi-region impact studies,
a representation of the CAP budget is included as a vehicle to more
fully quantify EU enlargement costs (Brockmeier et al., 2003;
Philippidis and Karaca, 2009). These studies do include an own
resources module, although the rebate mechanism is either absent
(Brockmeier et al., 2003) or incomplete (Philippidis and Karaca,
2009). In addition, neither study makes any provision for pillar 2
payments.
In seeking to assess the sectorial and macroeconomic impacts of
CAP budgetary reform, the present study also employs a multi-
region CGE framework. Since the accompanying database exhibits
coverage of economy-wide and gross bilateral trade activity for all
individual EU member states, it is possible (and more desirable
from a modelling perspective) to fully endogenise the behavioural
and accounting conventions of the CAP budget within the model
framework (i.e., member state receipts and contributions, UK
rebate and subsequent ‘corrective’ mechanisms). As a result, for
those countries under consideration, one can directly examine
the sectorial impacts (i.e., prices, output) in agricultural and non-
agricultural activities arising from CAP expenditure cuts and con-
comitant productivity changes (see later), as well as the ‘income
transfer’ implications for the broader macro-economy arising from
changes in net-contributions to the CAP budget.
In addition to the agreed CAP budget cut for the 2014–2020
MFF, this study also contemplates an ‘upper limit’ 50% cut in nom-
inal expenditure which was proposed by the UK government
during the negotiations (Agrafacts, 2012). In part, this proposal
was a defensive posture in response to those EU member states
calling for the elimination of the UK rebate, but was also made in
direct reference to the 2008–2009 CAP budget review.3 As a signif-3 The statement of the 2008–2009 budget review clearly links CAP spending with
UK rebate: ‘‘The European Council. . .invites the Commission to undertake a full, wide
ranging review covering all aspects of EU spending, including the CAP, and of resources,
including the United Kingdom rebate, to report in 2008/9. On the basis of such a review,
the European Council can take decisions on all the subjects covered by the review. The
review will also be taken into account in the preparatory work on the following Financial
Perspective’’ (European Council, 2005).icant improvement on the current literature, ofﬁcial audit data from
the European Commission is employed to fully capture pillar 2
expenditures within the CAP budget and model database. Moreover,
this data source is also used to correct inaccuracies in the coverage of
EU domestic support in the CGE model database as well as provide a
principle source of information for the design of a highly detailed
CAP baseline scenario capturing actual payment changes to agricul-
tural sectors by EU member state under the CAP Health Check
reforms (including the re-coupling of pillar 1 support payments).
Finally, compared with the aforementioned literature, the modelling
of the own resources component of the CAP budget is improved to
include all UK rebate-related correction mechanisms.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section two dis-
cusses the model framework, data and scenario design. Section
three analyses the results, whilst section four concludes.Methodology
Data and model framework
With its unparalleled level of commodity and country coverage,
the well-known Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database and
associated CGE model framework (Hertel, 1997) is the de facto
research methodology for examining the economic impacts of
bilateral, regional and multilateral trade policy scenarios. In its lat-
est incarnation, version 8.1 GTAP data (Aguiar et al., 2012) is
benchmarked to 2007 and covers 57 commodities and 134 regions.
As a ﬁrst step, the GTAP toolkit constitutes an important point of
departure. Notwithstanding, additional modelling and data work
are necessary in state-of-the-art CGE applications to fully explore
the agricultural policy speciﬁcs at hand. As a result, the current
paper employs a GTAP variant, known as the Modular Agricultural
General Equilibrium Tool (MAGNET).4 A key strength of the MAG-
NET model is that it allows the user to choose a la carte those sub-
modules of relevance to the study. Employing developments in the
modelling literature, this version of MAGNET captures the speciﬁci-
ties of agricultural factor and product markets to characterise the
heterogeneity of land usage by agricultural activity; a regional
endogenous land supply function; the sluggishness of capital and
labour transfer between agricultural and non-agricultural sub-sec-
tors with associated wage and rent differentials; the inclusion of
substitution possibilities between feed inputs in the livestock sec-
tors; and additional behavioural and accounting equations to explic-
itly characterise EU agricultural policy mechanisms (i.e., production
quotas, single farm payment, pillar 2 payments). The MAGNET model
also employs a recursive dynamic treatment of adaptive expecta-
tions investment behaviour which ensures that investment distribu-
tion across regions is consistent with exogenous shocks in capital
(see Section ‘Aggregation and closure’) over successive time
periods.54 For a full description of the MAGNET model see Woltjer and Kuiper (2014).
5 Given exogenous changes in capital stocks, regional rates of return adjust
endogenously such that investment ﬂows respect the (medium to long-run)
assumption of a constant capital stock to output ratio in each region (see ch. 14,
Woltjer and Kuiper, 2014).
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reﬁnements to the GTAP data and MAGNET model structure to
improve the precision of the study, which are fully discussed in
Appendices A and B. As a ﬁrst step, a full inventory of the GTAP
EU domestic support data employing the documentation from
Jensen (2010) is conducted. Additional programs are written to
explicitly identify payment totals corresponding to all classes of
CAP support (i.e., ‘decoupled’; ‘coupled direct payments’; ‘market
measures’; ‘additional direct transfers’; ‘other EAGF payments’;
‘agri-monetary transfers’; ‘rural development Axis 1 and 2 pay-
ments’),6 which are cross referenced with their payment source
(i.e., national governments or EU); the relevant tax wedge in the
GTAP data (i.e., ad valorem intermediate input-, output- or factor
taxes) and the recipient GTAP agricultural sector. A comparison with
the EU’s Clearance Audit Trail System (CATS) data,7 demonstrated
the need for a more comprehensive picture of pillar 2 EU domestic
support policies in the 2007 benchmark (see Appendix A). Moreover,
a recalibration of the standard GTAP data is performed to link pillar 1
decoupled payments exclusively to the land factor, thereby breaking
the link between the payment received and the farmer’s production
decisions (i.e., a ‘coupling factor’ of zero).
A thorough knowledge of EU domestic support payments in the
GTAP data also serves as an essential starting point for designing
and implementing a detailed CAP baseline. Employing time series
data on pillar 1 and 2 from the CATS database allows one to con-
template meticulous contemporary CAP policy shocks, in particular
the re-coupling of support payments under the auspices of the so-
called article 68 provision (formerly article 69). To the best of our
knowledge, this level of detail in the coupled/decoupled split has
not been attempted in previous EU focused CGE applications. To
further support this extension, additional variables are inserted
into the CAP budget module to link each class of support payment
with both the relevant tax variables and the CAP budget account-
ing equations. Finally, the MAGNET model is also extended to cap-
ture the own resources mechanism, complete with the UK’s rebate
and associated correction mechanisms (see Appendix B).
Aggregation and closure
For the purposes of this study, the GTAP data is aggregated to 20
tradables, of which 16 are agri-food related, and 27 countries or
regions (Table 1). For the choice of EU regions, those members6 This typology of EU domestic support employed in the GTAP database cross-
references Jensen (2010) with the EU budget codes (EAGF and EAFRD for pillar 1 and
pillar 2 support respectively). In broad terms: ’decoupled’ includes those subsidies
with no link between the payment and the production of a speciﬁc product (i.e. single
payment scheme (SPS) and single area payment scheme (SAPS)); ’coupled’ maintains a
link between those payments received and the speciﬁc product or type of farming to
which they are targeted (i.e. animal premium, area aid, payment for speciﬁc
commodities in LFAs or outermost regions, etc.); ’market measures’ include instru-
ments which form part of the agricultural intervention mechanisms (i.e., vineyard
restructuring, speciﬁc aid for peas, beans, wine, sugar, etc.); ’additional direct transfers’
is an account composite reﬂecting a modulation redistribution mechanism (which
appeared in the old EAGF ﬁnancial framework period but now no longer used); ’other
EAGF payments’ includes support under health and consumer protection (i.e.
veterinary measure, phytosanitary intervention, etc.); ’agri-monetary transfers’
includes residual transfers related to currency ﬂuctuations; ’rural development Axis
1 and 2 payments’ includes those pillar 2 payments which aim to improve the
competitiveness of the agricultural sector, the environment and the countryside.
7 The Clearance Audit Trail System (CATS) database gathers details of all CAP
payments made to the recipients of the EAGF (European Agricultural Guarantee Fund)
and EAFRD (European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development), and previously (up
until ﬁnancial year 2006) to the recipients of the EAGGF (European Agricultural
Guarantee and Guidance Fund). These data are provided by the member states to the
Commission on an annual basis for the purposes of carrying out the clearance of
accounts, monitoring developments and providing forecasts in the agricultural sector
(European Commission, 2013). Recently CATS data have been used by the European
Commission to perform the impact assessment accompanying the 2013 CAP reform
proposals or CAP towards 2020 (European Commission, 2011). For more discussion on
the CATS database, see Appendix A.which beneﬁt from budget rebates are separated, (i.e. UK, Ger-
many, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark). As signiﬁcant
recipients of CAP funding, France, Spain and Italy are also disaggre-
gated, whilst Poland and Romania represent large recipient mem-
bers under the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, respectively. The
remaining EU countries are aggregated into ‘Other EU15’ and
‘Other EU12’. Lastly, as the 28th EU member state from July 1st,
2013, Croatia is treated separately. To examine possible third coun-
try impacts from CAP budget reform, non EU regions are grouped
into either ‘large players’ on global agri-food markets or impover-
ished partners. All residual trade and output ﬂows are captured
within a Rest of the Word (ROW) region.
In terms of the model closure, all primary factor endowments
(except land) and policy variables (ad valorem taxes and tariffs)
are assumed exogenous. In neoclassical CGE models, technical
change is traditionally treated as exogenous. This study takes the
same approach, although output- and input-augmenting technical
changes in relation to pillar 2 expenditures are treated endoge-
nously.8 To ensure macro closure, withdrawals (savings (S), imports
(M) and CAP contributions (CC)) must equal injections (investment
(I), exports (X) and CAP receipts (CR)).9 Under conditions of ﬁxed
savings rates and steady state investment behaviour, with marginal
CAP budget changes (i.e., CC – CR), the trade balance must adjust
such that the regional balance of payments sums to zero. At the mar-
gin, this modiﬁcation has important implications for the model
results (see Section ‘Results and discussion’).Scenario design
Table 2 describes the policy shocks within the baseline, which is
implemented over two time periods (2007–2013–2020) to recon-
cile with the MFF and Croatia’s accession to the EU. For the macro
projections shocks (I.a. and II.a. in Table 2), labour projections are
assumed to follow changes in regional population, whilst capital
endowment shocks are equal to regional macro growth forecasts
(i.e., ﬁxed capital-output ratio). Data on macro growth and popula-
tion projections are sourced from USDA (2013) whilst land produc-
tivity data is from IMAGE (Bruinsma, 2003). Trade policy shocks
(I.b. and II.b. in Table 2) are focused on existing or planned commit-
ments within the 2007–2020 time horizon, whilst further potential
multilateral (i.e., Doha) and bilateral (i.e., United States, Mercosur,
Japan, etc.) trade shocks are not contemplated due to the uncer-
tainty of a ﬁrm timetable for agreement.
In terms of agricultural policy shocks (I.c and II.c in Table 2), the
2007–2013 period incorporates detailed sector and region speciﬁc
pillar 1 and 2 ‘actual’ expenditures (i.e., not ceiling limits) up to
2011 taken from the CATS database (see Appendix B). Pillar 2 pay-
ments are aggregated to ﬁve categories employed within the MAG-
NET model (‘agri-environmental schemes’; ‘least favoured areas’;
‘physical capital’; ‘human capital’ and ‘wider rural development’).
Given the ‘co-ﬁnanced’ nature of pillar 2 support between EU
and individual member state budgets, policy shocks to national
government pillar 2 spending are also implemented in the ﬁrst
period based on the CATS data. In the second period, owing, to a
lack of alternative data, it is assumed that both the co-ﬁnance rates
and the distribution of pillar 2 expenditures in member states
remain the same as in the ﬁrst period. Payment totals for Croatia
in the second period are taken from European Commission
(2009), whilst exogenous projections for the CAP budget over the
2014–2020 MFF are taken from European Commission (2011).
In addition to the baseline shocks, three CAP budget cut scenar-
ios are explored in the second period. In each case, exogenous8 See Appendix ‘Pillar 2 payments and productivity effects’ for a discussion on the
treatment of pillar 2 productivity effects.
9 In the non-EU regions, both CR and CC are zero.
Table 2
Assumptions shaping the baseline scenario.
I. Baseline shocks (2007–2013 period)
I.a. Projections
 Skilled and unskilled labour, capital, natural resources, population, and macro growth
I.b. Trade policy shocks
 Non reciprocal EU tariff eliminations with the Everything But Arms countries
I.c. Agricultural policy (including 2008 Health Check reforms)
 Phasing in of decoupled payments for 2004 and 2007 accession members
 Targeted removal of speciﬁc pillar 1 coupled support payments: Arable crops, olives and hops to be fully decoupled from 2010; Seeds, beef and veal payments (except
the suckler cow premium) decoupled by 2012, Protein crops, rice and nuts will be decoupled by 1 January 2012, Abolish the energy crop premium in 2010
 Re-coupling of support under the article 68 provision: Member states may use up to 10 per cent of their ﬁnancial ceiling to grant measures to address disadvantages
for farmers in certain regions specialising in dairy, beef, goat and sheep meat, and rice farming
 Pillar 2 payments to the EU27 under the ﬁnancial framework
 Cumulative shocks for milk quotas rise of 1 per cent annually from 2009 to 2013
 Projected reduction in CAP expenditure share of the EU budget
 Change in Swedish and Dutch lump sum rebates corresponding to CAP expenditure share of EU budget
II. Baseline shocks (2013–2020 period)
II.a. Projections
 Skilled and unskilled labour, capital, natural resources, population, and real GDP
II.b. Trade policy shocks
 EU Enlargement elimination of border protection between incumbent EU27 and Croatia
 Erection of an EU common external tariff (CET) on third country trade for Croatia and reciprocal third country CETs extended to Croatia as an EU member
 Non reciprocal EU tariff eliminations with the MENA, Eastern Partnership and Sub-Saharan Africa regions
 Non reciprocal EU tariff eliminations extended to Croatia
 Removal of all export refunds
II.c. Agricultural policy
 Phasing in of decoupled payments for 2007 accession members and Croatia
 Pillar 2 payments extended to Croatia
 Abolition of raw milk (2015) and raw sugar (2017) quotas
 Croatia incorporated within the CAP budget and UK rebate mechanism
 Projected reduction in CAP expenditure share of the EU budget
 Change in Swedish, Dutch and Danish lump sum rebates corresponding to CAP expenditure share in EU budget. UK rebate is maintained (European Council, 2013)
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budget share of the CAP budget assuming that the non-agricultural
spending concepts remain unchanged.10 In scenario 1, consistent
with the political agreement reached on June 27, 2013, pillar 1 and
pillar 2 nominal expenditures are cut 13% and 18%, respectively
(European Council, 2013). This corresponds to a 15.2% cut in nominal
CAP budgetary funding. Scenarios 2 and 3 explore politically expedi-
ent upper limits to the CAP budget cut. During the negotiations, the
UK pushed for a cumulative €200 billion cut over the 2014–2020
ﬁnancial period (Agrafacts, 2012), which corresponds to a 50% nom-
inal expenditure cut to the CAP budget by 2020. Thus, scenario 2
imposes a uniform 50% cut to both pillars, whilst in scenario 3 it is
assumed that under the same 50% budget cut the UK makes a concil-
iatory reduction to its rebate to the extent that its net CAP position
remains the same as in the baseline.Results and discussion
CAP budget and welfare impacts
In this section, unless otherwise stated, estimates are presented
in comparison with the baseline (status quo) scenario. The com-
plexity of the CGE model framework renders a full discussion of
all the model results as unwieldy. Thus, the focus is on the CAP
budgetary and welfare effects, as well as the output, price and
trade balance impacts for speciﬁc regional and sectoral aggre-
gates.11 To understand the driving mechanism behind the results,
a useful starting point is the representation of the revenues and costs
corresponding to the CAP budget at the end of the baseline period
2007–2013 (top part of Table 3). The last column of the ﬁrst row10 Given the focus of this study, no attempt is made to model the complexities of
remaining EU budgetary policies (e.g., structural funds).
11 A full set of results for all regions and sectors is available from the authors upon
request.shows total CAP receipts of €52,340 million accruing to the EU mem-
ber states. This total is split between pillars 1 and 2 amounting to
€41,114 million and €11,222 million, respectively.12 Of the former,
decoupled payments total €38,435 million and remaining coupled
payments sum to €2684 million.13 Contributions to the CAP budget
are ﬁnanced by tariff revenues and a uniform EU-wide percentage
of each member’s gross domestic product (GDP). The rebate row in
Table 3 accounts for the net impacts on EU members from both
the UK rebate and additional corrective payments.
The ‘net position’ row shows that the ‘old’ EU15 (except Spain,
RoEU15 and Austria) are net contributors to the CAP budget, whilst
the newer member states (as expected) are net beneﬁciaries. This
observation underlies the redistributive nature of the CAP. A closer
look reveals that France is the largest recipient of CAP funding, but
makes signiﬁcant payments to the CAP budget and the UK rebate
whilst receiving no special dispensation. On the other hand, the
Austrian rebate (in the form of reduced GDP contributions) renders
this country as a small net beneﬁciary from the CAP. As a percent-
age of GDP the largest net contributors are Germany and the Neth-
erlands (0.18% and 0.15% respectively) despite the fact that both
receive partial rebates. Moreover, even with a sizeable rebate, the
UK is still a net contributor to the CAP budget (€1733 million or
0.08% GDP). The newer member states typically receive net sup-
port which ranges from 0.6% to 0.8% of GDP.
On the basis of these estimates, a CAP budget cut would beneﬁt
(detriment) net contributors (net beneﬁciaries) in the form of a
taxpayer saving (loss). In the model, income changes feedback to
each economy as an increase (decrease) in expenditure and sav-
ings. This effect is demonstrated in the lower part of Table 3. As
an initial observation, the results are consistent for scenarios 1
and 2 in terms of the comparative magnitudes across regions and12 The pillar 2 ﬁgure reported in Table 3 excludes nationally co-ﬁnanced support.
13 In the GTAP database, coupled payments are assigned to subsidies on output,
intermediate inputs (both domestic and imported), land and capital (see Appendix A).
Table 3
The CAP budget (€millions, 2007 prices).
UK NL SE DK DE AT FR IT ES Rof15 PL RO Rof12 HR EU28
A. CAP budget estimates in 2013
1. CAP receipts 3671 1228 930 964 6410 1242 8390 5084 6096 6708 4359 1816 5443 0 52340
Pillar I: Decoupled 3013 1115 654 888 5177 622 6888 3752 4352 4633 2744 1018 3579 0 38435
Pillar I: Coupled 62 43 10 21 88 80 728 250 761 510 27 43 61 0 2684
Pillar 2: LFA 54 1 41 1 157 126 292 105 72 419 243 109 289 0 1909
Pillar 2: agri-env. 348 22 149 27 364 272 218 341 392 510 241 112 524 0 3521
Pillar 2: physical K 73 12 26 5 288 56 120 413 303 340 278 135 475 0 2526
Pillar 2: human K 20 1 12 8 4 15 71 103 90 157 403 53 105 0 1044
Pillar 2: wider dev. 96 34 37 14 332 70 73 123 127 138 423 346 409 0 2222
2. CAP contribution 8458 2537 1487 953 10822 1152 7708 5933 4055 4925 1635 605 2070 0 52340
3. Rebates 3054 431 89 96 325 37 932 697 471 532 190 70 224 0 0
4. Net position 1733 878 468 85 4737 53 250 1546 1571 1251 2534 1141 3149 0 0
% of GDP 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.63 0.76 0.66 0.00
B. Scenario 1: Budget agreement (MFF) vs. baseline in 2020
1. CAP receipts 507 163 134 128 891 188 1129 716 842 950 646 253 574 65 7187
2. CAP contribution 1199 336 204 132 1439 157 1050 760 539 674 260 96 312 28 7187
3. Rebates 445 36 6 6 40 5 128 90 64 75 31 11 35 3 0
4. Net position 246 137 64 10 589 26 49 135 239 202 356 146 228 33 0
C. Scenario 2: UK proposal of 50% cut in CAP budget vs. baseline in 2020
1. CAP receipts 1835 614 465 482 3205 621 4195 2544 3048 3354 2179 828 1862 217 25451
2. CAP contribution 4248 1194 722 468 5103 556 3709 2690 1908 2393 915 337 1107 100 25451
3. Rebates 1556 116 20 23 137 16 446 314 221 260 106 39 121 10 0
4. Net position 857 464 238 9 2036 49 40 460 919 702 1159 452 635 107 1
D. Scenario 3: UK proposal 50% cut in CAP budget plus UK rebate reduction vs. baseline in 2020
1. CAP receipts 1835 614 465 482 3205 621 4195 2544 3048 3354 2179 828 1862 217 25451
2. CAP contribution 4250 1194 722 468 5103 556 3709 2690 1908 2392 915 337 1107 100 25451
3. Rebates 2415 104 12 49 188 22 668 470 331 389 159 58 181 16 0
4. Net position 0 476 245 35 2086 43 182 616 809 572 1106 433 575 101 0
Notes: 4 = 1–2 + 3. ‘Rebate’ includes UK rebate and lump sum corrective payments. CAP contribution includes both tariff and GDP payments.
The budget reduction in the 2007 and 2013 accession member states is below 50% compared with 2013, since these are still receiving additional payments in the 2013–2020
period.
15 Allocative efﬁciency gains arise from changing resource or product usage in the
presence of market distortions (taxes, tariffs and subsidies). For example, a taxed
activity leads to below pareto optimal purchases/employment of a product or factor,
such that policies that encourage increased usage of that product or factor result in an
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(scenario 1) implies relatively small adjustment costs, where the
biggest winner (loser) is Germany (Poland) with a gain (loss) of
€589 million (€356 million). These corresponding totals rise to
€2036 million (€1159 million) under the UK’s proposal (scenario
2). In scenario 3, the UK is estimated to relinquish €2415 million
in rebate to remain ﬁnancially equivalent to the baseline CAP bud-
getary position, of which the largest beneﬁciary is France
(€668 million) followed by Italy (€470 million).
Table 4 presents a decomposition of the real income or equiva-
lent variation (EV) changes for a selection of regions. Measured in
per capita income terms, the impacts are muted owing to the local-
ised nature of the shocks (i.e., restricted to EU agriculture). In the
EU, the largest per capita real income gains accrue to net contrib-
utors, such as the Netherlands and Germany. This is consistent
with the CAP budget cost as a percentage of GDP statistic reported
in Table 3. Under a similar line of reasoning, the biggest per capita
income losers are the new member states, especially Romania
(between 0.2% (scenario 1) and 0.6% (scenarios 2 and 3)). The
EV results show larger losses accruing to the ‘new’ EU13 states
vis-à-vis the EV gains of the ‘old’ EU15 states. This result is driven
by the endowment and technology effects (see Section ‘Impacts on
factor and product markets’).
Decomposing EV into money metric measures, the dominating
driver is the CAP budget effect, resulting in EV gains for the UK,
the Netherlands, Germany and France and concomitant losses in
Spain, Poland and Romania.14 Elsewhere, EU members generally
realise allocative efﬁciency gains due to the contraction in agricultural14 Although the results are not shown for all the EU regions, as a rule, net
contributors to (beneﬁciaries of) the CAP budget realise EV gains (losses).activities; increased imports of tariffed manufactured goods; and
output rises in domestic services sectors (see Section ‘Impacts on
factor and product markets’).15 In Spain, Poland and Romania,
although subsidised agricultural activity contracts (i.e., allocative
efﬁciency gain), manufacturing imports and domestic services out-
put also fall relative to the baseline resulting in net allocative efﬁ-
ciency falls. As the unit price ratio of exchange between exports
and imports, the terms of trade impact in the EU regions is the net
result of (i) increasing agri-food prices from partial elimination of
agricultural support and (ii) changes in the real exchange rate (i.e.,
factor prices).16 The endowment effect measures incremental real
income impacts through changes in factor usage. This value is
reported as negative in the EU regions due to the idling of agricul-
tural land from the CAP budget cuts and is an explanatory factor
for the fall in EU28 EV.
The technology measure captures the money metric equivalent
from improvements in output or input augmenting technical
change. Under budget cuts, reductions in pillar 2 investments in
human and physical capital in agriculture and wider rural mea-
sures generate productivity losses in agricultural and (to a lesser
extent) non-agricultural sectors. This negative effect is particularly
pronounced in Poland. In contrast, the UK and Austria witness
small positive technological EV gains because approximately 60%allocative efﬁciency gain.
16 In the UK and the Netherlands, real macro growth rises slightly leading to small
increases in wages and capital rents compared to the baseline. This result is discussed
in Section ‘Impacts on factor and product markets’.
Table 4
EV impacts in selected regions vs. baseline in 2020 (€millions, 2007 prices).
UK NL DE FR ES PL RO EU15 EU13 EFTA USA MERC AUSNZ CHN IND JAP LDC
Scenario 1: Budget agreement (MFF)
EV 299 182 593 14 346 723 321 482 1525 11 103 141 26 30 4 8 54
Per cap U (%) 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Decomposition:
ALLOC 19 14 91 32 11 39 34 241 63 9 1 23 2 11 36 3 6
TOT 24 41 53 20 39 77 95 27 218 5 72 89 19 19 16 6 27
ENDW 3 7 89 61 12 65 13 323 149 3 16 17 1 25 22 1 8
TECH 4 4 42 28 38 194 42 213 352 0 8 7 2 23 3 0 8
POP 6 3 4 1 8 4 3 4 11 0 6 5 1 2 1 0 4
CAP 243 135 585 49 238 353 141 754 753 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scenario 2: UK proposal (50% cut in CAP budget)
EV 1027 628 2023 235 1296 2256 976 1299 4607 46 393 531 98 114 224 40 210
Per cap U (%) 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.13 0.46 0.62 0.01 0.37 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Decomposition:
ALLOC 66 50 306 80 45 108 101 785 157 38 4 88 8 46 19 13 23
TOT 75 148 172 39 147 242 289 34 655 22 264 333 71 96 102 30 102
ENDW 11 27 334 237 52 229 43 1218 519 12 58 61 5 94 114 2 32
TECH 11 12 128 76 105 540 116 610 984 1 37 27 8 108 1 1 34
POP 21 9 14 1 31 11 10 17 34 0 29 22 5 14 11 1 18
CAP 843 459 2021 40 916 1149 437 2325 2326 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Scenario 3: UK proposal (50% cut in CAP budget) plus UK rebate reduction
EV 67 643 2084 43 1158 2187 943 1108 4425 47 398 533 99 109 222 37 211
Per cap U (%) 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.11 0.45 0.60 0.01 0.35 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Decomposition:
ALLOC 13 51 311 100 36 103 98 775 142 38 4 88 8 44 17 13 23
TOT 79 150 178 74 131 231 278 10 623 23 269 334 72 93 102 28 104
ENDW 6 26 333 236 51 228 42 1220 516 12 59 61 5 94 115 2 32
TECH 18 12 129 78 106 541 116 607 986 1 38 27 8 108 1 1 34
POP 2 9 15 3 28 11 10 27 32 0 29 22 5 14 11 1 19
CAP 0 471 2071 180 806 1097 419 2196 2191 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: ‘ALLOC’ is allocative efﬁciency; ‘TOT’ is terms of trade; ‘ENDW’ is endowment effect; ‘POP’ is population effect; ‘CAP’ is CAP budget effect.
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assigned to (productivity reducing) agri-environmental measures.
Comparing between scenarios 2 and 3, the UK witnesses an EV
loss (Table 4), due to its reduced rebate, whilst the UK’s real
exchange rate depreciation compared with the baseline (not
shown) leads to a terms of trade deterioration. Moreover, the
reduction in UK real income in scenario 3 lowers demand for both
manufacturing imports and services output, resulting in negative
allocative effects.
In the non-EU regions, per capita real income impacts are neg-
ligible due to the largely non-distortionary nature of EU agricul-
tural policy (Table 4). On the other hand, the results clearly show
that agricultural net exporters (e.g., USA, MERC, AUSNZ) gain, with
concurrent losses in net importing regions (EFTA, China, India,
Japan). This reﬂects the slight increase in agricultural export prices
which has beneﬁcial (detrimental) terms of trade impacts for agri-
cultural net exporters (importers). Interestingly, there is (limited)
scope for less developed country (LDC) welfare gains from the bud-
get cuts, although this result masks the heterogeneity of relative
agricultural trade competitiveness within this regional aggregate.17 Although not shown, agricultural world price rises are no greater than 0.6% even
under conditions of a 50% CAP budget cut. This muted price effect also, in part, reﬂects
the relatively high armington elasticities employed within the GTAP database.
18 Corresponding simulation estimates in the non-EU regions are not shown since
the results are negligible.Trade impacts
Table 5 presents changes in the trade balances for a selection of
EU and non-EU regions. Given the nature of the experiment design,
trade balances changes are linked with the macro closure dis-
cussed in Section ‘Aggregation and closure’. For a net paying mem-
ber state to the CAP budget, the proposed cuts reduce budget
contributions proportionally more than budget receipts. At the
margin, this CAP budget saving generates an EV gain leading to ris-
ing imports. In policy terms, increases in real incomes are accom-
panied by rises in the marginal propensity to import, resulting intrade balance deteriorations. The same logic applies in the opposite
direction for net recipients of CAP funds with falling EV. For exam-
ple, under the current political agreement for CAP budget reform
(scenario 1) the EU15 trade balance deteriorates by €681 million,
whilst the EU13 trade balance improves €1528 million. Since the
EV loss for the EU13 exceeds the EU15 EV gain, the EU28 trade bal-
ance consequently improves €847 million. Under the general
closed system of global accounting equations, an improved EU28
net trade balance is accompanied by a corresponding (minor) dete-
rioration in non-EU region trade balances.
In scenario 1, the EU28 agricultural and food trade balances
deteriorate €410 million and €260 million, respectively
(Table 5). In scenarios 2 and 3, these ﬁgures deteriorate by approx-
imately €1500 million and €950 million, respectively. As
expected, non-EU28 agricultural net exporting regions (e.g., USA,
MERC & AUSNZ) witness small agri-food trade balance improve-
ments in all scenarios.17 Across the EU’s non agri-food sectors, the
trend follows that of the macro trade balance. Thus, in the EU15,
with a rising propensity to import (and higher income elasticities
for non-food products), the trade balance deterioration in manufac-
turing and services is a rising function of the size of the CAP budget
cut. In the EU13, the reverse occurs.
Impacts on factor and product markets
In Tables 6 and 7 are shown output and price impacts in
selected EU regions under all three policy scenarios.18 As expected,
agricultural (and food) market price rises are driven in large part by
Table 5
Net trade balance effects vs. baseline in 2020 (€millions, 2007 prices).
UK NL DE FR ES PL RO EU15 EU13 EFTA USA MERC AUSNZ CHN IND JAP LDC
Scenario 1: Budget agreement (MFF)
Agric 3 5 66 35 1 103 10 201 210 3 87 74 8 3 12 2 71
Food 34 6 92 20 24 107 28 191 69 12 45 37 28 10 27 6 17
NatEnergy 4 0 6 2 3 15 10 0 36 2 0 17 4 12 6 6 9
Manu 238 104 424 47 241 716 405 278 1501 23 293 211 39 32 13 71 125
Servs 125 53 75 10 107 115 60 12 269 9 87 48 18 15 8 10 33
MACRO 335 146 663 3 327 637 493 681 1528 24 248 165 26 2 13 72 79
Scenario 2: UK proposal (50% cut in CAP budget)
Agric 27 13 292 168 6 312 30 886 650 11 329 283 30 13 11 9 271
Food 114 21 370 78 93 306 86 765 181 39 168 133 107 38 63 20 63
NatEnergy 12 2 19 12 11 51 31 18 114 7 1 64 16 47 27 21 34
Manu 810 352 1343 438 927 2235 1222 368 4556 76 1057 780 145 51 115 244 472
Servs 430 181 240 96 402 358 182 94 811 32 319 176 66 57 79 35 123
MACRO 1166 496 2264 301 1253 2026 1490 1906 4649 86 877 605 91 77 169 247 296
Scenario 3: UK proposal (50% cut in CAP budget) plus UK rebate reduction
Agric 25 13 293 168 5 312 31 886 652 11 330 283 30 13 11 9 271
Food 160 21 371 92 98 310 83 758 191 39 169 134 107 38 63 20 63
NatEnergy 1 2 20 9 10 50 29 21 110 7 2 65 15 46 27 20 33
Manu 119 357 1384 248 851 2175 1176 231 4392 74 1051 783 145 49 117 243 473
Servs 102 188 255 41 358 347 175 189 773 34 335 178 67 54 75 39 126
MACRO 86 508 2322 38 1126 1949 1433 1666 4432 86 886 609 91 76 167 251 297
Table 6
Output effects vs. baseline in 2020 (% changes).
Scenario 1: Budget agreement (MFF) Scenario 2: UK proposal (50% cut in CAP
budget)
Scenario 3: UK proposal (50% cut in CAP budget) & UK
rebate reduction
UK DE FR PL EU28 UK DE FR PL EU28 UK DE FR PL EU28
Land 0.07 0.82 0.54 0.45 0.51 0.32 3.21 2.24 1.73 2.00 0.32 3.21 2.25 1.73 2.00
Wheat 0.06 0.24 0.18 1.42 0.29 0.16 1.17 0.76 4.49 1.08 0.13 1.17 0.76 4.49 1.08
Ograins 0.22 0.18 0.07 0.87 0.24 0.74 0.89 0.34 2.77 0.92 0.75 0.89 0.35 2.77 0.92
Oilseeds 0.00 0.23 0.18 1.41 0.29 0.35 1.22 0.83 4.48 1.15 0.33 1.22 0.83 4.48 1.15
Rawsugar 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.51 0.29 0.39 0.21 0.08 0.51 0.30 0.39 0.21
Vegfrunuts 0.06 0.09 0.15 1.43 0.17 0.00 0.65 0.68 4.30 0.64 0.01 0.65 0.68 4.30 0.64
Catshp 0.12 0.01 0.35 0.98 0.26 0.36 0.07 1.47 2.34 1.01 0.36 0.07 1.47 2.35 1.01
Pigspoultry 0.14 0.21 0.11 1.04 0.25 0.36 0.90 0.48 3.15 0.89 0.36 0.89 0.48 3.15 0.89
Rawmilk 0.11 0.26 0.03 0.34 0.14 0.37 1.08 0.12 1.05 0.51 0.37 1.08 0.12 1.05 0.51
AGRIC 0.12 0.21 0.15 1.06 0.22 0.31 0.95 0.65 3.21 0.83 0.31 0.95 0.65 3.21 0.83
Red meat 0.00 0.11 0.39 0.53 0.32 0.07 0.44 1.55 1.33 1.18 0.07 0.43 1.55 1.34 1.18
White meat 0.18 0.28 0.12 0.98 0.22 0.47 1.13 0.52 2.95 0.76 0.49 1.13 0.52 2.95 0.75
Dairy 0.12 0.31 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.42 1.25 0.11 0.33 0.42 0.42 1.25 0.11 0.33 0.42
Sugar 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.70 0.34 0.33 0.22 0.11 0.70 0.35 0.33 0.21
Vegoilsfats 0.06 0.32 0.45 0.36 0.07 0.31 1.15 1.87 1.19 0.17 0.38 1.14 1.88 1.17 0.16
FOOD 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.36 0.08 0.10 0.41 0.20 1.09 0.30 0.09 0.41 0.21 1.09 0.30
NATENE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01
MANU 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.54 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.53 0.04
SERV 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.21 0.00
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Table 7). The magnitude of these cost-push increases is positively
related to the magnitude of the CAP support cuts. Given this loss
of competitiveness, agriculture and food production falls in the EU
(Table 6), although the relative impact is less than 1% for the
EU28, even under a 50% budget cut. Firstly, this is because pillar 1
agricultural support is predominantly production neutral. Indeed,
even in those regions (e.g., France, Spain) which recouple support
under the auspices of article 68, decoupled payments still constitute
the majority of pillar 1 (90% in France and 85% in Spain). Moreover,
given the medium run modelling assumption regarding the
restricted movement of capital and labour to, and from agriculture,
as well as the restrictions on land use changes, agricultural supply
responsiveness is expected to be inelastic.19 The larger price rises19 Compared with the standard GTAP model, in this study agricultural labour
(mainly unskilled) and capital are willing to accept larger wage or rent falls before
moving to non agricultural activities.and production falls in Polish agriculture reﬂect productivity losses
from cuts to its (considerable) pillar 2 investments. At the other
extreme, UK agricultural activity increases slightly since the cut in
its relatively large agri-environmental payments sets UK agriculture
on a path toward a more intensive production system.
In the EU28 land market, falls in aggregate demand result in
(marginal) land abandonment of between 0.5% (scenario 1) to
2% (scenarios 2 and 3) (Table 6). Due to the inelastic nature of
the land supply curves, EU28 landowner rents (row 1, Table 7) fall
more sharply, averaging 4% and 14% under scenarios 1 and 2,
respectively. In policy terms, this largely reﬂects the lost capitalisa-
tion of land rents from reductions in the single farm payment.
In the services sector, there is a greater intensity of ‘skilled
labour’ so service sector output is less affected by sectorally
trapped agricultural unskilled labour. Moreover, the import depen-
dency ratio for EU services is considerably below that of manufac-
turing (i.e., less import competition). Thus, in those EU regions
where real income improves from CAP budget cuts (e.g., UK,
Table 7
Market price effect vs. baseline in 2020 (% changes).
Scenario 1: Budget agreement (MFF) Scenario 2: UK proposal (50% cut in CAP budget) Scenario 3: UK proposal (50% cut in CAP budget) &UK
rebate reduction
UK DE FR PL EU28 UK DE FR PL EU28 UK DE FR PL EU28
Land (owner) 5.80 3.76 4.97 3.15 4.06 21.62 13.27 17.90 11.27 14.49 21.60 13.27 17.90 11.27 14.49
Land (farmer) 2.35 6.91 4.98 2.81 4.34 7.99 28.56 21.29 10.85 17.38 8.04 28.57 21.28 10.85 17.39
Wheat 0.17 0.33 0.24 1.01 0.29 0.78 1.36 0.93 3.46 1.11 0.77 1.37 0.93 3.47 1.12
Ograins 0.08 0.38 0.26 1.45 0.46 0.35 1.52 1.01 4.76 1.67 0.34 1.52 1.02 4.77 1.68
Oilseeds 0.20 0.39 0.35 1.02 0.39 0.95 1.65 1.40 3.54 1.51 0.94 1.65 1.40 3.55 1.51
Rawsugar 0.01 0.54 0.45 3.08 0.56 0.68 2.38 2.00 11.91 2.50 0.67 2.38 2.00 11.92 2.50
Vegfrunuts 0.10 0.23 0.21 1.13 0.30 0.55 1.01 0.89 3.58 1.11 0.55 1.01 0.89 3.59 1.11
Catshp 0.23 0.31 0.97 1.22 0.72 0.95 1.20 3.82 3.84 2.75 0.94 1.20 3.83 3.85 2.75
Pigspoultry 0.11 0.33 0.28 1.24 0.44 0.51 1.25 1.08 3.97 1.54 0.50 1.25 1.08 3.98 1.55
Rawmilk 0.01 0.60 0.37 2.54 0.59 0.14 2.39 1.45 8.51 2.17 0.14 2.40 1.46 8.52 2.17
AGRIC 0.12 0.38 0.36 1.32 0.43 0.56 1.51 1.43 4.35 1.59 0.55 1.51 1.43 4.35 1.59
Red meat 0.11 0.17 0.32 0.27 0.24 0.47 0.64 1.25 0.86 0.92 0.45 0.64 1.25 0.87 0.92
White meat 0.08 0.20 0.15 0.46 0.15 0.34 0.74 0.59 1.49 0.55 0.32 0.74 0.59 1.50 0.55
Dairy 0.01 0.19 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.75 0.34 0.24 0.41 0.06 0.75 0.34 0.25 0.41
Sugar 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.42 0.20 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.42 0.21 0.08 0.10
Vegoilsfats 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.03 0.23 0.64 0.39 0.28 0.00 0.23 0.64 0.38 0.26
FOOD 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.34 0.25 0.50 0.26 0.06 0.34 0.26 0.51 0.26
NATENE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.03
MANU 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.29 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.28 0.05
SERV 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.36 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.35 0.04
126 P. Boulanger, G. Philippidis / Food Policy 51 (2015) 119–130Germany, France), the resulting increase in domestic demand leads
to slight rises in services output. Using a similar logic, in EU regions
where real income falls (e.g., Poland), services output also con-
tracts. In the UK, since the services sector is relatively prominent
as a proportion of GDP, real income rises in scenarios 1 and 2 lead
to real growth improvements, factor price rises and concomitant
real exchange rate appreciations (not shown). In scenario 3, real
income in the UK falls very slightly, such that services sector out-
put remains ﬂat and non-land factor returns fall.20
The manufacturing sector is relatively more ‘unskilled labour’
intensive, whilst it also faces greater import competition. In those
EU member states which undergo real income increases, demand
rises lead to relatively stronger import substitutioneffects accompa-
nied by a lower domestic supply response. In the EUmemberswhich
are relativelyworseoff,manufacturing output improves slightly. For
the EU28 the overall impact on manufacturing and services is mini-
mal given that general equilibrium (i.e., resource reallocation) ripple
effects from a ‘small’ sector such as agriculture are muted.Conclusions
This study examines the potential trade and welfare implica-
tions arising from a reform to the European Union’s common agri-
cultural policy budget. A positive ﬁnding is that the cuts in the
budget under all scenarios have relatively limited impacts on third
countries, or indeed EU agricultural output. To a large extent, this is
to be expected given the assumption of production neutral behav-
iour with respect to the single farm payment. In the literature there
are possible channels coupling farmer production decisions to the
single farm payment (Moro and Sckokai, 2013), although there also
remains considerable parametric uncertainty regarding the appro-
priate ‘coupling factor’. Consequently, changes in agricultural out-
put are mainly linked to productivity effects arising from changing
pillar 2 expenditures.
As a further observation, the complex system of intra-commu-
nity transfers via the budget implies that policy induced changes
to agricultural expenditure limits have, at the margin, impacts on
intra-EU income transfers, real incomes and trade balances. Given
the redistributive nature of CAP support, in relative terms the larg-
est winners (losers) from CAP budget cuts are the Netherlands and20 These observations explain the UK’s ToT changes (Table 4) under scenarios 1 to 3.Germany (Romania and Poland). Whilst the UK is found to be a net
CAP budget contributor even with the rebate, the biggest gains
from reducing the UK rebate (scenario 3) accrue to France – a result
which underlines France’s strong opposition to this mechanism.
As is the case in all empirical studies, a number of caveats should
be observed. Firstly, no assumption is made regarding how, for
example, potential taxpayer savings (losses) frombudget reductions
are allocatedwithin national economies. In the current study, this is
manifested as a rise (fall) in aggregate savings and domestic
demand. Other possibilities that could be explored, however, are
thediversionof funds to researchanddevelopment activities, or per-
haps as a subsidy to labour. Alternative assumptions will clearly
have different implications on economic performance. Secondly,
the elasticity of productivity change to pillar 2 expenditure changes
is currently based on a limited pool of literature and informed qual-
itative expectation. Although further literature is emerging (Mary,
2013), additional research is necessary. Related to this is the poten-
tial reverse ‘crowding out effect’ from the withdrawal of publically
ﬁnanced pillar 2 investments. In other words, the extent to which
private investment could mitigate productivity reductions, particu-
larly thoseobserved in thenewermember states. Finally, thewelfare
results reported here for the EuropeanUnion are biased by the inter-
pretation of the endowment effect. Whilst marginal agricultural
landwhich falls out of production registers as a loss to the economy,
there is nomitigatingmechanism for its possibleuptake in non-agri-
cultural uses (e.g., forestry, construction).
As a ﬁnal remark, the compromise budget agreement, consis-
tent with scenario 1 of this study, was the result of months of polit-
ical horse-trading representing a broad spectrum of vested
interests across the European Union member states. In this context,
that an eleventh hour political agreement was reached at all should
be hailed as an achievement. Notwithstanding, with a budget
review scheduled for 2016 and the economic crisis exposing cracks
within a multi-speed trading bloc, it is quite possible that the cur-
rent agreement may only serve as a short term stop-gap prior to a
further round of tough negotiations.
Disclaimer
The views expressed are purely those of the author and may not
in any circumstances be regarded as stating an ofﬁcial position of
the European Commission.
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Examining the GTAP database (version 8.1), a ﬁrst step was to
extract a fully detailed categorisation of all agricultural domestic
support payments which are allocated across the tax wedges cor-
responding to the factors of production, output and intermediate
inputs. This task served as a starting point for (i) examining the
comprehensiveness of the EU domestic support data in GTAP and
(ii) designing a detailed CAP policy baseline post-2007 (GTAP
benchmark year) targeting detailed payment changes within the
speciﬁc tax wedges of the GTAP data.
In the GTAP documentation and associated excel spread sheets,
Jensen (2010, 2009) splits agricultural support payments for each
of the EU27 members following the OECD classiﬁcation of single
commodity transfers (SCT); all commodity transfers (ACT); group
commodity transfers (GCT) and other transfer payments (OTP).
Within each of these 4 classiﬁcations, one can ﬁnd a rich but not
exhaustive array of different support payments (i.e., ‘decoupled’;
‘coupled direct payments’; ‘market measures’; ‘additional direct
transfers’; ‘other EAGF payments’; ‘agri-monetary transfers’; ‘rural
development Axis 1 and 2 payments’ and ‘national payments’).
SCTs are commodity speciﬁc support payments, so it is possible
to see the exact amount of each type of SCT payment which corre-
sponds to each agricultural activity in each EU region in the GTAP
database. Unfortunately, by their very nature, one cannot directly
extract the value of GCT or ACT type payments by activity. Conse-
quently, to disentangle these values, we followed the approach ofTable A1
Total Pillar 1 and 2 CAP expenditures (€ millions in current prices).
GTAP v.8.1 data 200
PILLAR 1
Market measures (05_02) 729.5
Decoupled direct payments (05_03_01) 31527.0
Coupled direct payments (05_03_02) 5510.7
Additional direct payments (05_03_03) 533.9
Other EAGF 245.9
Agri-monetary 14.5
1. Total PILLAR 1 38532.5
PILLAR 2 (EU sourced):
Investment in physical capital 1338.5
Investment in human capacity 31.6




PILLAR 2 (Nationally sourced):
Investment in physical capital 1977.8
Investment in human capacity 1090.0




4. Total PILLAR 2 11509.9
Total CAP expenditure (1 + 4) 50042.5
a Given the nature and small share (approximately 2% of pillar 1) of payments devo
unchanged in the baseline and subsequent time period.Jensen (2010, 2009) by employing detailed output share data for
2007 from Eurostat’s economic accounts for agriculture. This
yielded a full classiﬁcation of GCT and ACT agricultural domestic
support payments by type, activity and respective GTAP support
wedge (i.e., factor subsidy; output subsidy; or intermediate input
subsidy). For the purposes of accuracy, all agricultural support pay-
ments originating from national governments do not pass through
the CAP budget accounting structure. These national payments,
which sum to €10,446 million (in 2007 prices at the 2007 €:$
exchange rate (0.7305)), are also identiﬁed by GTAP activity and
support wedge.
A second step involved cross-checking the output generated in
step 1. To accomplish this, the European Commission’s principle
database for the statistical recording and auditing of CAP pay-
ments, known as the Clearance Audit Trail System (CATS) database,
is employed. Table A1 shows a summary comparison (aggregated
to the EU27) between the CATS data and the GTAP version 8 data
in 2007 and complete CATS data for the latest year (2011) at the
time the research was conducted.
A comparison of the two datasets reveals that the degree of cov-
erage of pillar 2 payments in the GTAP data is incomplete when
compared with the CATS data. In the GTAP database, there is cov-
erage of most Axis 1 (investments in physical and human capital)
and Axis 2 (least favoured area and agri-environmental) payments.
On the other hand, GTAP data has no coverage of Axis 3 (wider
rural development measures), Axis 4 (local development strate-
gies) and Axis 5 (technical assistance). As a result, in the GTAP
database, pillar 2 expenditures total €11,510 million, compared
with €18,170 million in the CATS dataset. On the other hand, a
comparison by payment measure shows that GTAP based expendi-
tures on physical (EU and nationally sourced) and human (nation-
ally sourced) capital exceed those corresponding expenditures
recorded in CATS. In the absence of more detailed documentation
from GTAP, we can only speculate on the reasons for this. A closer






















ted to market measures, other EAGF and agri-monetary payments, these are left
21 Since x = dX/X ⁄ 100, then, X ⁄ x = dX ⁄ 100.
22 Pillar 2 payments on physical capital, human capital and wider rural development
measures do not appear in Eq. (A.1) (see Appendix ‘Pillar 2 payments and productivity
effects’).
23 In linear terms, the endogenous percentage change in the ’composite’ tax power
’t’ is the ratio of prices p1 to p3 (p1 = t + p3), where p1 = t1 + p2, t1 is the change in tax
power corresponding to payment measure 1; p2 = t2 + p3, t2 is the change in tax power
corresponding to payment measure 2; and t = t1 + t2.
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are supposed to be co-ﬁnanced national expenditures (large val-
ues). This leads us to suspect that in the GTAP data, the national
component may include additional independent ﬁscal measures
by member states which have been added to their co-ﬁnanced
expenditures. In the far right hand side column of Table A1, CAP
expenditures for 2011 are presented which are employed as a basis
for the agricultural baseline of this study. The important point here
is the change in the decomposition of CAP support both in terms of
the distribution between pillars 1 and 2, as well as the ongoing
shift in pillar 1 expenditures toward decoupled support (at the
aggregated EU27 level, it is not possible to see the importance of
article 68 (recoupled) payments in those member states which
use this option (e.g., France, Italy or Spain)).
A third data step is then performed involving a recalibration
(Malcolm, 1998) of the existing data ﬂows in the GTAP database.
Thus, the ﬁrst part of the recalibration procedure involved the
removal of existing GTAP Axis 1 and 2 payments by sector and
region and the insertion of the CATS representation of pillar 2 pay-
ments by member state. Thus, ‘least favoured area’ (LFA) and ‘agri-
environmental’ payments are calibrated as uniform payments to
the land factor across all agricultural activities (Nowicki et al.,
2009) (see also Appendix ‘Pillar 2 payments and productivity
effects’). A second part of the recalibration procedure involved
the reallocation of decoupled support from all factors (GTAP
default setting) to the land factor as a uniform land subsidy rate.
In effect, the recalibration of decoupled support assumes that the
single farm payment (SFP) is production neutral, excludes cross
commodity effects and capitalises the entire SFP into the value of
land. Comparing with the standard GTAP model representation,
the reduction or removal of this payment produces considerably
smaller production falls in agricultural sectors, whilst changes in
the SFP are now fully capitalised into the market price of land
(Urban et al., 2012). Thirdly, apart from energy and services input
subsidies, ‘intermediate input subsidies’ in the GCT and ACT cate-
gories are calibrated as a single uniform subsidy rate for domestic
and imported inputs ‘i’ to the agricultural sectors ‘j’. Intermediate
input subsidies related to farm services are all inserted on agricul-
tural usage of the ‘other business services’ sector. Agricultural
intermediate input subsidy rates for energy usage (i.e., fuel
rebates) are left unchanged in the GTAP database.
Appendix B. Modelling
CAP budget expenditures
In the GTAP data, CAP support payments are traditionally repre-
sented as tax wedges between the agents price and themarket price.
As noted in Appendix A, the OECD classiﬁcation of domestic sup-
port dictates on which ﬂow (i.e., output, input or endowment) each
support payment is paid. In the accompanying GTAP model, these
wedges are represented as exogenous ad valorem tax ‘powers’ sum-
marising the ratio of agent to market price. Following the conven-
tion of the GTAP database, for input- and factor-based tax powers,
a subsidy implies that the price paid by the agent (i.e., farmer) is
lower than the market price, whilst on output-tax powers, a sub-
sidy implies that the market or sales price of activity ‘j’ is lower
than the agent (i.e., farm gate) price.
In reality, CAP support payments which are ﬁxed in nominal
terms are driven by policy, whilst the standard GTAP treatment
incorrectly implies that the level of support received changes with
endogenous changes in (pre- and post-tax) prices and quantities,
even when the tax power is ﬁxed (Woltjer and Kuiper, 2014). To
circumvent this problem, the standard MAGNET treatment draws
a direct relation between the (endogenous) percentage changes
in the tax power and the (policy driven) change in the CAP pay-ment. In general terms, the percentage change in the output/
input/factor tax power (tax_p) is endogenously determined as
(lower case letters are ‘percentage change’ variables and dropping
subscripts):
VF tax p ¼ 100 d PAY  PAY  ½pmþ q ðA:1Þ
where VF is the output/input/factor value ﬂow (in pre-tax prices)
upon which the tax is levied and d_PAY is the ‘change’ in the value
of the agricultural payment.21 The coefﬁcient PAY is the benchmark
value of the agricultural payment which is calibrated within the
GTAP data output/input/factor tax wedge22 and pm and q are per-
centage changes in the market price and quantity in sector ‘j’, respec-
tively. Thus, in ﬁrst order terms, the percentage change in the tax
power is a function of the change in the agricultural payment, whilst
the second term on the right hand side is a correction factor to
remove agricultural payment changes owing to endogenous adjust-
ments in quantities and market prices.
In turn, d_PAY is a function of changes in existing agricultural
payments calibrated within the GTAP database (d_PAYEXIST) and
additional (exogenous) agricultural payment changes (d_PAYNEW)
post 2007:
d PAY ¼ d PAYEXISTþ d PAYNEW ðA:2Þ
In addition, d_PAYEXIST is determined as:




where ‘payexist’ (exogenous) is the percentage change in existing
CAP payments, PAYt=0 is the value of CAP payments in benchmark
period 0 which is updated by d_PAY in the next period. This implies
that changes in both existing and new agricultural payments in per-
iod t become the initial value of agricultural payments in period
t + 1 (i.e., PAYt=1). Additional accounting equations are implemented
to calculate CAP budget payment totals by region.
In the standard MAGNET CAP budget module, pillar 1 expendi-
ture is only represented by decoupled payments. In the current
paper, the deﬁnition of pillar 1 in the CAP budget module has been
broadened to include all CAP payments. Following the convention
in Eqs. (A.1)–(A.3), a modiﬁed version of the model code includes
changes in payments and percentage changes in tax powers for
decoupled and ‘other’ payments. In the case of decoupled pay-
ments, we assign them exclusively to a uniform land tax power
across all using agricultural activities ‘j’ within a region. For
remaining payments, an additional index is added to the equations
to distinguish the payments by measure (i.e., coupled direct pay-
ments, market measures, additional direct transfers, other EAGF
payments, agri-monetary transfers), which in turn are linked to
their speciﬁc output-, input-, and endowment-tax power variables
in each agricultural activity ‘j’. In those cases where one or more
payment measures is linked to the same tax wedge, in ﬁrst order
linear terms, the composite (endogenous) tax wedge is the sum-
mation of the percentage changes in the tax powers for each pay-
ment measure.23
In the MAGNET model, pillar 2 payments are aggregated into
ﬁve ‘classiﬁcations’ according to the fundamental similarities in
their economic mechanisms. Pillar 2 payments on ‘agri-environ-
mental schemes’ and ‘least favoured areas’ are tied to the land
tax power (Nowicki et al., 2009) following the general approach
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ital, human capital and wider rural development are captured as
additional expenditures within the accounting equations of the
CAP Budget, but are not linked to any subsidy wedge (see Section
‘Pillar 2 payments and productivity effects’). Given the degree of
detail within the CATS database, a key point of deviation from
the standard MAGNET model is that pillar 2 payments are also split
by their source of origin (i.e., EU or national government) in recog-
nition of the co-ﬁnanced nature of these payments (see Appendix
A). Thus, both EU and nationally sourced pillar 2 payments appear
in the land subsidy wedge (i.e., least favoured area and agri-envi-
ronmental payments) and accrue productivity effects (i.e., human
capital, physical capital, agri-environmental payments, wider rural
development measures), but only EU sourced pillar 2 payments
appear in the accounting equations of the CAP budget.
CAP Budget own resources module
In MAGNET, there is no module to account for the own-
resources component of the CAP budget. This module constitutes
an additional feature of the current study. In line with EU law,
75% of each EU member’s tariff revenue (TREV) is collected (the
remaining 25% is assigned to administrative costs) to ﬁnance the
EU Budget, which can be calculated from the GTAP database. In
general terms:
TREVs ¼ CAPSHR  0:75 ½VIMPORTMs  VIMPORTWs ðA:4Þ
where IMPORTMs and IMPORTWs are total imports to EU region ‘s’
at market and world prices, respectively. In this paper, only the CAP
component of the EU budget is modelled. To calculate those tariff
resources which are channelled from EU member states to cover
CAP expenditures, we employ the CAP share of EU budget spending
(exogenous variable, CAPSHR). Employing ﬁnancial framework pro-
jections data and own calculations, the benchmark value of CAPSHR
is calculated and shocked over the 2007–2020 time horizon (see
scenario design). In addition, the EU legislation stipulates the use
of value added tax (VAT) contributions to meet EU budget expendi-
tures. In the current study, this source of EU budgetary funding is
not included in the model code owing to the incompleteness of
the VAT data in the GTAP model.
By summing over all EU sourced (pillars 1 and 2) CAP payments,
one calculates the EU-wide cost of the CAP (EUCAPCOST). Calculat-
ing total EU tariff revenues by summing TREVs over all EU regions
‘s’ and subtracting from EUCAPCOST gives the remaining resource
cost of the CAP budget (RESOURCE). This shortfall is met by an










Multiplying RATE by the value of GDP in each member state,
gives each EU members’ GDP contribution (MSGDPs). Thus, for
the purposes of accounting consistency, the CAP budget balances
(i.e., EU-wide CAP budget payments and revenues are equal).
At the member state level, the following equation applies:
NETPOSs ¼ CAPBUDs  TREVs MSGDPs þ LUMPPAYs þ REBATEs
ðA:7Þ
where NETPOSs is the net CAP budget position of each EU member
and CAPBUDs are the total payments received by each EU member
from the CAP budget. Thus, an individual member state may be anet contributor (i.e., CAPBUDs < (TREVs + MSGDPs)) or a net beneﬁ-
ciary (i.e., CAPBUDs > (TREVs + MSGDPs)). To maintain the identity
that regional expenditures must equal regional incomes in the
model, the calculation of regional savings by EU member in the
benchmark GTAP database is adjusted in accordance with each EU
member states’ benchmark budgetary position.
In line with the European Council Agreement of February 2013,
from 2014 in addition to the Netherlands and Sweden, Denmark
also receives an (exogenous) annual lump sum transfer payment
(LUMPPAYs). The cost of these intra-budgetary transfers is met
endogenously by the remaining member states (negative LUMP-
PAYs values) as a function of their value share of EU GDP. Further
accounting equations are inserted to consider the UK rebate and
subsequent corrections to other member states. In accordance with
the EU budgetary agreement, the UK rebate (REBATEUK) is calcu-
lated as 66% of its net contribution, NETPOSUK (i.e., only when NET-
POSUK < 0). The (negative) value of REBATEs for remaining EU
members is calculated multiplying their EU GDP value shares by
the UK rebate. This calculation is, however, modiﬁed to account
for the fact that Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden
only pay 25% of their GDP share contribution to the UK’s rebate,
which is compensated by the remaining EU members in proportion
to their EU GDP value shares.
In the 2007 benchmark, the CAP budget applies to EU27 regions.
Additional exogenous switch variables are employed to incorpo-
rate Croatia both within the CAP Budget own resources, the UK
rebate and subsequent member state correction mechanisms (in
line with the European Council Agreement of February 2013 on
2014–2020 MFF).
Pillar 2 payments and productivity effects
In the standard MAGNET model, the long list of different rural
development (pillar 2) measures are aggregated into groups
according to the similarities in the economic mechanisms which
underlie them. In short there are ﬁve classes of pillar 2 payments:
(i) investment in human capital (e.g., vocational training, setting up
of young farmers, use of advisory services, etc.); (ii) investment in
physical capital (e.g., modernisation of agricultural holdings, infra-
structure investments, adding value to agricultural and forestry
products, etc.); (iii) agri-environmental payments (e.g., Natura
2000 payments, forest-environment payments, etc.); (iv) least
favoured areas (e.g., payments to farmers in mountainous areas);
and (v) wider rural development schemes (e.g., diversiﬁcation into
non-agricultural activities; encouragement of rural tourism; vil-
lage renewal and development, etc.). By their nature, ‘agri-environ-
mental schemes’ and ‘least favoured areas’ are directly tied to the
land factor (Nowicki et al., 2009), whilst the remaining three clas-
ses of pillar 2 payments, which are not linked to any speciﬁc factor
demand, intermediate input demand or output in the farming sec-
tors, are not calibrated to any subsidy wedge within the GTAP data.
In terms of productivity effects, pillar 2 payments of classes (i),
(ii), (iii), and (v) are assumed to incur endogenous output or input
productivity effects. Investments in physical capital are posited to
lead to increases in productivity in agricultural sectors. Estimates
(indirect and direct) of vintage effects of investment in physical
capital on output productivity suggest a rate of return of 30%
(Nowicki et al., 2009), based on research by Wolff (1996) and
Gittleman et al. (2006).
Investments in human capital are assumed to increase output
productivity in agricultural sectors. Greater awareness of farming
practise leads to (inter alia) better use of machinery, improved fer-
tiliser, pesticide and feed application, and more efﬁcient land use
(e.g., better timing, producing higher quality products). The
assumed productivity parameter of 0.4 is employed in MAGNET
based on the research of Evenson (2001), which suggests an
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an investment of one euro per unit of physical capital stock
increases output productivity by 40%.
As the largest budgetary component of pillar 2, expenditures on
agri-environmental measures compensate farmers in return for a
more extensive (i.e., less capital and labour intensive production
processes) production system. Pufahl and Weiss (2009) show that
agri-environmental payments can generate an increase in marginal
land use that might otherwise have gone out of production. Fol-
lowing Nowicki et al. (2009), it is assumed in the MAGNET model
that labour and capital productivity in agricultural sectors
decreases by 5% for every one euro of expenditure on agri-environ-
mental schemes.
Finally, wider rural development schemes encapsulate a broad
variety of initiatives to reverse economic and social decline in rural
areas by promoting innovation and creating employment opportu-
nities in rural areas, thereby promoting output productivity change
not only in agriculture but also in the wider rural economy. By way
of assumption (Woltjer and Kuiper, 2014), MAGNET employs the
same rate of return as that used for physical capital investments
(i.e., 30%).
In modelling terms, output augmenting technical change in
agricultural sector ‘j’ (OAj) follows an ad hoc endogenous speciﬁca-
tion. Employing CATS data, total expenditures (i.e., EU and nation-
ally sourced) of human capital (HK), physical capital (PK) and
wider rural development measures (WID) are inserted as follows
(dropping the regional subscripts):












whereH,U andN are technical change transfer parameters relating
to HK, PK and WID schemes with values of 0.4, 0.3 and 0.3, respec-
tively. Thus, the ratio of HK to the total cost-price value of agricul-
tural output (based on GTAP data) multiplied by H, yields the
output augmenting technical change in agricultural sector ‘j’ from
HK. The proportion of PK to the total cost-price value of the agricul-
tural capital stock (based on GTAP data) multiplied by U, yields the
output augmenting technical change in agricultural sector ‘j’ from
PK. Finally, the proportion of WID to the total cost-price value of
all sectors’ output (based on GTAP data) multiplied by N, yields
the output augmenting technical change from physical capital
expenditures in agricultural sector ‘j’ from WID.
In the non-primary agricultural sectors, output augmenting
technical change is assumed to respond to changing WID expendi-
tures only (dropping the regional subscripts):
OAj ¼ N WIDP
k2TRADVOAk
 
j 2 NAGRIC ðA:9Þ
In levels terms, the endogenous speciﬁcation for changes in
labour and capital factor ‘f’ (in the set NLAND) augmenting techni-
cal change in agricultural sector ‘j’ (FAf,j) resulting from changes in
agri-environmental (AE) pillar 2 payments is given below (drop-
ping the regional subscripts):





f 2 NLAND j
2 AGRIC ðA:10Þ
where W is a technical change transfer parameter relating to
changes in agri-environmental pillar 2 expenditures with a value
of 0.05. Thus, the ratio of AE payments to the total value of labourand capital factor usage in agriculture (based on GTAP data) multi-
plied by W, yields the input augmenting technical change from
human capital expenditures in agricultural sector ‘j’.
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